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SUMMARY
EU member states that are neutral or militarily non-aligned, or that have an opt-out from 
common defence, are often overlooked in discussions about European defence.
The existence of these special status states not only creates uncertainty about the EU’s 
ambitions to become a fully fledged defence union but also calls into question the 
functionality of the mutual defence clause, Article 42.7, in the long run.
The special status states fall into three groups according to the challenges they pose to the 
EU: the “non-aligned in name only” (Finland and Sweden); the “odd one out” (Denmark); 
and the “strategic schnorrers” (Austria, Ireland, and Malta).
The EU’s work on its Strategic Compass should include debates on the special status states’ 
future role in European defence, as well as discussions on the operationalisation of the 
union’s mutual defence clause.
Introduction
When Austria applied to join the European Communities (EC) in 1989, the European Commission 
opined that the applicant’s “permanent neutrality” would be incompatible “with the provisions of the 
existing treaties” and would pose a problem to “the obligations entailed [by the EC’s] future common 
foreign and security policy”. Still, in 1993, shortly after the Maastricht Treaty converted the EC into 
the European Union and established the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the bloc launched 
accession negotiations with neutral Austria. The country became a member of the EU in 1995.
Austria is not the only state that has joined the EU or its predecessor organisations despite being 
neutral. Ireland joined the EC in 1973. Finland and Sweden became members of the EU in 1995; 
Cyprus and Malta in 2004. These six countries self-identify as “neutral” or “non-aligned”. Some of 
them have enshrined this status in their constitutions; others’ neutrality is less formalised but no less 
ingrained. While neutrality remains a somewhat elusive and ambiguous concept in international 
relations, experts generally agree that neutral states are prohibited from joining military alliances. 
This is why none of the six neutral states is a member of NATO. They are, however, members of the 
EU – whose declared aim is to become a “fully-fledged European defence union” by 2025.
This goal might give the non-aligned states pause, as it seems at odds with even the minimalist 
interpretation of neutrality. Alongside the neutral countries, there is a seventh member state for 
which the EU’s efforts to become a more coherent and stronger actor in the defence realm could cause 
concern: Denmark. The country joined the EU in 1973. It is a founding member of NATO. However, 
following a domestic referendum held after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, Denmark 
decided to opt out of European defence. As a result, it has followed recent EU defence efforts mainly 
from the sidelines. This publication refers to the seven EU countries that are neutral or non-aligned, 
or that have a defence opt-out, as “special status states”. It does not cover Cyprus – which, as a 
divided and partially occupied EU country that is in conflict with Turkey, presents different challenges 
than the other six states.
Admittedly, the EU’s interest in defence comes and goes, depending on threat perceptions and 
member states’ engagement with the issue. For many, the EU remains a primarily economic project. 
But the ambition to become a security and defence alliance is as old as the union itself, with some of 
its members having discussed plans for a ‘European army’ as early as the 1950s. The EU established 
the Common Security and Defence Policy two decades ago. Over the last few years, the EU has 
considerably stepped up its efforts in the defence realm – driven by a heightened sense of insecurity 
following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the election of Donald Trump as US president in 
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2016, and the United Kingdom’s 2016 decision to leave the bloc. Initiatives such as Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund are meant to increase cooperation 
on defence projects and foster a sense of military solidarity across the EU. (Interestingly, some 
European leaders have recently described these efforts as “strengthening the European pillar of 
NATO”, thereby effectively disregarding the existence of neutral and non-aligned states.) 
Furthermore, the EU aims to become a stronger geopolitical actor by increasing its ‘strategic 
autonomy’ – its capacity to act independently and to safeguard its interests in the international realm. 
In 2020 the union embarked on the two-year development of a Strategic Compass that, based on a 
common threat analysis, aims to define the EU’s level of ambition as a security provider.
A defence union or a military alliance?
None of these defence efforts or stages of European integration prompted Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Malta, or Sweden to leave the EU or avoid joining it in the first place. Most 
importantly, the countries remained EU members when, in 2009, the bloc introduced its mutual 
defence clause, Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty.
Article 42.7 obliges EU countries to aid a fellow member state that becomes “the victim of armed 
aggression on its territory” by “all the means in their power”. This formulation is reminiscent of the 
better-known Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls on NATO member states to assist a 
party being attacked “by taking forthwith … such action as it deems necessary, including the use of 
armed force”.
Article 42.7 Lisbon Treaty (EU)
“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its 
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an 
obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This 
shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with 
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
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Article 5 Washington Treaty (NATO)
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use 
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area …”
Reading Article 42.7, one could conclude that the EU already is, in fact, a defence alliance. At a 
minimum, it raises questions about how the neutral states square the circle of being a member of a 
union that has a mutual defence clause while upholding their non-aligned status. The EU attempts to 
address this contradiction in the article, stating: “this shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States”. This provision, also known as the ‘Irish clause’, 
is generally understood to refer to the neutral or non-aligned EU member states, effectively giving 
them an opt-out from EU mutual defence in case of an attack. As this essay collection shows, the 
special status states differ to a surprising degree in their interpretation of the applicability of Article 
42.7. And it is unclear whether Denmark’s opt-out applies to Article 42.7. This became evident in 
2015, when the article was invoked for the first (and, so far, only) time following the Paris terrorist 
attacks. Many EU states provided help to France in different ways. Some special status states took 
action, while others did not.
Dangerous ambiguity or a clever way forward?
Thus, the story of the special status states in the EU is about ambiguity. Neutrality is a contested 
concept. And Article 42.7 leaves more room for interpretation than one might expect for a clause in a 
legally binding text – what, for example, are “all the means in [member states’] power”? This is 
exacerbated by the Irish clause, which introduces further uncertainty about which countries are 
subject to the article. The EU has a history of strategically employing ambiguity in internal and 
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external discussions. It is a tactic that deliberately leaves room for interpretation so that potential 
supporters can project their wishes onto an idea, even if there is no consensus on its actual meaning. 
But what may work in theoretical debates about strategic autonomy is much more dangerous and 
inadvisable in its practical applications, especially in the defence realm. There is no harm in ambiguity 
over the level or type of autonomy Europe strives for, particularly if this allows for step-by-step 
developments. But ambiguity over whether and how many firefighters respond to an emergency call 
appears to be considerably more problematic.
Mutual defence agreements live and die on certainty about the actions of one’s allies. This is why 
Europeans were so unsettled by Trump’s questioning of the US commitment to Article 5. But, when it 
comes to Article 42.7, ambiguity is everywhere. If the EU’s aim is to become a defence union, and able 
to do more without support from other actors such as the US, it will need to operationalise – and 
clarify member states’ responsibilities under – Article 42.7 (as Germany, France, Italy, and Spain 
recently called for in a joint declaration). If it does so, the EU will need to look at states that stand 
apart, one way or another, on defence.
This essay collection looks at these special status states, focusing on what their EU membership 
means for European defence and the bloc’s future ambitions. It discusses the ways in which these 
countries reconcile the mutual defence clause and growing European defence cooperation with their 
special status. Do they feel bound by Article 42.7 and buy into the ambitions of a defence union? And, 
if they are willing to contribute, would this be compatible with their domestic laws, today or in the 
future?
To answer these questions and shed some light on what this ambiguity will mean for European 
defence and the EU’s ambitions to become a defence union, we turned to experts from the special 
status states. The essays at the heart of this publication were written by Gustav Gressel (Austria), 
Christine Nissen (Denmark), Tuomas Iso-Markku and Matti Pesu (Finland), Clodagh Quain (Ireland), 
Roderick Pace (Malta), and Calle Hakansson (Sweden). The six essays are similar in structure to allow 
for direct comparisons on key issues, including their current level of engagement in EU operations, 
the way they reacted to France’s invocation of Article 42.7, and their national debates.
Analyses of EU politics seldom group these states, and they rarely work together, in the way that, for 
instance, several eastern European countries do in the Visegrád group. The essays help illustrate why 
this is the case. The special status states may have some shared characteristics, such as their 
comparatively small size: Sweden is the largest of the group, with ten million inhabitants; Austria has 
nine million; and most of the others have around five million – the exception being Malta, with only 
450,000. But the states also differ on many points, not least the precise characteristics of their special 
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status: for some of the countries, such as Austria and Finland, it was the post-second world war world 
that led them to adopt non-alignment, while Sweden has not formally taken sides in a war since 
Napoleon was advancing across Europe. Malta only anchored neutrality in its constitution in 1987, 
and did so primarily for domestic reasons, while Ireland’s neutrality is not enshrined in domestic law 
or any international treaty. Their security situations and concerns, and their military capabilities, vary 
widely – which ultimately influences how they see and approach EU defence efforts.
Can the EU reach its goal of becoming a fully fledged actor in international security and defence while 
it includes seven special status states that, for various reasons, may be unable or unwilling to fully buy 
into mutual European defence? Might it only achieve this through fragmentation or the creation of a 
‘multi-speed Europe’? And, if some states are more equal than others when it comes to mutual 
defence requirements, is there a danger that they could face accusations of free-riding? The EU would 
be well advised to use the development of its Strategic Compass to discuss these and similar concerns 
regarding the special status countries. This essay collection aims to contribute to that process.
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Free-rider for life: Austria’s inability to fulfil its defence 
commitments
Gustav Gressel
EU member since: 1995
Neutral since: 1955 (treaty with powers that were victorious in the second world war)
Population: 9 million
Current defence spending as a share of GDP: Approximately 0.7 per cent
Number of troops: Active: 22,050 (including conscripts and non-combat administrative 
personnel); reserve: 33,000 (10 battalions totalling around 3,000 cadres, which are trained reserves; 
the remaining reserve force exists only on paper, as it does not receive training and hence cannot be 
deployed in a crisis or war).
Surviving by luck
Austria’s neutrality was prescribed in the 1955 state treaty concluded between the country and the 
four then-occupying powers: Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The treaty 
placed a series of restrictions on Austria’s military not to develop certain capabilities and to refrain 
from engaging in various forms of international cooperation and organisations (some of which the 
government has since lifted). However, most restrictions were put into the treaty not to prescribe 
neutrality but to prohibit any approximation, assimilation, or de facto integration with Germany (
Anschlussverbot). Austria adopted permanent neutrality in the form of constitutional law on 26 
October 1955. However, it has amended and reinterpreted the law several times since then. In a 
nutshell, Austria is not allowed to join a defensive military alliance (one with a common defence 
clause such as Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty or NATO’s Article 5) nor to host permanent foreign 
military installations on its soil.
While the Austrian political establishment agreed on and advocated the basic exchange of sovereignty 
for neutrality shortly after the re-establishment of the state in April 1945, tensions and conflicting 
interests prevented the deal from being concluded for another decade. The Soviet Union wanted to 
make Austria a role model for other European states to withdraw from the formation of NATO, while 
the US tried to buy time to build up a more resilient state apparatus. In the end, they both failed: 
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Austria was neither a role model for anyone else nor a resilient neutral state that could take care of its 
own security, such as Switzerland.
Unlike Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, Austria would not have tried to defend itself 
independently if the cold war in Europe ever turned hot. In the event of a conflict, the army was set to 
symbolically “fire five shots at the border”, as former foreign minister and chancellor Leopold Figl put 
it. And then Austria would de facto rely on NATO’s interest in defending or liberating the country for 
the sake of its own security (though Vienna always overestimated its willingness to do so).
This complacency nearly ended in disaster. When in 1968 Warsaw Pact troops intervened in 
Czechoslovakia, they also prepared a further advance into Austria. To this day, it is still unclear 
exactly when and why the Soviet leadership decided that “Operation Danube” (the codename for the 
intervention) did not reach the river for which it was named. Despite engaging in a deep reform of its 
armed forces and military doctrine thereafter, Austria never invested enough resources in its defence 
to be sufficiently resilient.
This lack of resilience was not confined to the defence sector. In the late 1980s, a series of scandals 
shook the small republic, revealing that – with the help of communist intelligence agencies and 
dubious brass-plate enterprises – some members of the political elite were engaged in businesses such 
as the illegal arms trade, large-scale insurance fraud, murder, and smuggling. They had often dragged 
captured state institutions into these enterprises. The dire state of Austria’s domestic politics was one 
incentive for it to seek membership of the European Economic Community by the end of the 1980s – 
reasoning that the European framework would provide some safeguards against domestic failings.
However, Austrian leaders hardly seemed to have learned – or had quickly forgotten – the lessons of 
the cold war. The European Union’s nascent foreign policy barely featured in the 1995 accession 
round. Because militarisation was unpopular domestically, Austrian politicians reassured the public 
that European defence policy would be compatible with neutrality – even though experts disagreed.
Early discussions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) revolved around international stabilisation missions. As Austria had 
participated in UN missions since the 1960s, its involvement in those missions under the auspices of 
the EU never triggered the kind of debate about compatibility with neutrality that occurred in 
Switzerland.
Indeed, Vienna was eager to contribute to the international stabilisation missions in the Balkans, 
including Operation Alba in Albania (1997); the Kosovo Force (since 1999); the Stabilisation Force in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with its successor mission (since 1995); and EUFOR Concordia in 
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Macedonia (2003). This is because it was in Austria’s interest to stop the bloodshed near its borders. 
Most Austrians saw these missions as justified, with only a few groups on the ideological fringes 
challenging them. Hence, the Constitutional Court dismissed challenges to amendments to the 
Wehrgesetz and KSE-BVG, the laws on the armed forces and on deploying soldiers abroad 
respectively.
However, Vienna lost interest in robust missions once some EU and NATO operations moved beyond 
the Balkans. The deployment of a single special forces company to EUFOR Chad in 2007-2008 was 
the peak of Austria’s contribution to robust EU missions. The contribution drew heavy criticism from 
both the left and the right: how dare the government expose soldiers to the risk of fighting? After it 
became publicly known that Austrian soldiers shot and killed rebels (in a legitimate act of self-
defence), no Austrian minister of defence tried to participate in a demanding military operation ever 
again.
Since then, Austria has made only non-combat contributions to the Common Security and Defence 
Policy, including through civilian missions, observer and training missions, and logistical support 
(such as supply and maintenance services) for EU battlegroups. Austria’s defence ambitions were in a 
steady decline.
No need for an army
One could endlessly debate the political and legal arguments that Austrian politicians and scholars 
make for why Austria should not abide by Article 42.7. But the defining factor in the Austrian 
Sonderweg (special path) is less the country’s legal restrictions or tradition of free-riding than a 
structural factor: its lack of armed forces with which to fulfil a defence commitment. Of course, on 
paper, Austria has armed forces – the Bundesheer. But, in practice, the combat readiness and 
capabilities of the organisation would not allow it to conduct any war-fighting operation.
In 2018 Austria’s technocratic caretaker government issued an honest assessment of the status of the 
armed forces and the capability shortfalls that have accumulated over time. The conclusion was that 
the armed forces would need an additional €16 billion of investment in equipment and an increase in 
the defence budget from €2.4 billion to at least €3.3 billion – roughly equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP 
– to be able to counter hybrid threats (such as those from state-sponsored insurgents, including the 
Turkish-backed Grey Wolves and Russian-sponsored illegal armed groups) or provide rear-echelon 
services in a crisis (such as the protection of critical infrastructure, and of EU military convoys passing 
through Austria). If the army wanted to consider fighting another peer competitor as part of an Article 
42.7 joint defence operation, it would require an even larger investment. This is because the 
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technological capabilities of powers in Europe’s vicinity – particularly Russia – have increased 
dramatically since the end of the cold war. Austria, in contrast, has for decades lacked critical 
capabilities, such as an air force capable of engaging ground targets. This means that it would require 
an enormous investment in training and education to achieve even minimal interoperability with 
other European armies. The report stated that, in essence, the Jagdkommando Special Forces are the 
only sufficiently trained and combat-ready part of the military. But they would be overstretched in any 
scenario beyond an isolated terrorist attack on Austria.
Addressing these gaps would also require organisational and legal reforms. The six months’ term for 
conscripts is too short to train personnel properly. The current system – which gives soldiers lifelong 
employment schemes like all other civil servants – has contributed to ageing the force. The expansion 
of the military bureaucracy, designed to find employment for elderly soldiers who can no longer serve 
in the field, consumes more and more resources. But, because all reforms since the end of the cold war 
have been conceived of by these ageing soldiers, they usually involve cuts to military capabilities. 
Reforms of the administrative bodies were window-dressing, at best.
After coming to power in January 2020, the new ‘political’ (as opposed to caretaker) government 
reverted to the long-established practice of adapting reality to political preferences. The new minister 
of defence declared that Austria was unlikely to face the threats covered in the report cited above: 
increasing tensions between the EU and Russia; deepening military and geopolitical tensions in the 
Mediterranean; and growing risks from globalisation such as pandemics, cyber attacks, and strategic 
terrorism. Hence, she argued, there was no need for defence capabilities. The armed forces would “
reform and restructure” to serve as an auxiliary force for domestic security and disaster relief 
operations, reducing defence capabilities “to a minimum” (as if there were any in the first place) to 
save funds.
So, whatever defence ambitions the Austrian government may declare in Brussels, there is no army 
capable of fulfilling them. Therefore, Austrian political elites – regardless of their political orientation 
– are mainly interested in engaging with EU defence structures to limit these ambitions, lest Austria 
reveal its weakness in military matters. Austria was eager to join Permanent Structure Cooperation (
PESCO), but not to contribute too much or to pick demanding projects (it has joined a cyber security 
programme with Greece, a disaster-response programme led by Italy, a military transport initiative, 
and the German-led centre for training missions). While Vienna sits at the table, it could use its 
position to block an increase in PESCO’s ambitions – even if, currently, there seems to be no danger 
that this will happen.
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Austria and the EU’s mutual defence clause
When Austria joined the EU, the CFSP had no dedicated military dimension and the need for 
unanimity often allowed neutral states to opt out of defence-related initiatives. On paper, this 
reconciled the conflicting demands of EU membership with permanent neutrality as adopted into 
constitutional law. It became more difficult to justify Austria’s participation under the ESDP and 
missions that could involve military action. The reasoning for this approach was that EU missions and 
sanctions would be based on UN mandates. States’ obligations under Article 103 of the UN Charter 
prevail over other international commitments, such as neutrality. As the state treaty was concluded 
after the advent of the UN Charter – and as Austria had been a member of the United Nations since 
1956, and had participated in UN missions since 1960 – the organisation of UN-mandated missions 
through EU structures would not dramatically change the country’s practices.
However, the Austrian debate always referred to out-of-area missions as a cause for concern. From an 
Austrian point of view, it was clear that Austria would never take part in any collective defence 
operation, regardless of its legitimacy. In the Austrian interpretation of Article 42.7, the so-called Irish 
clause (which says that the treaty “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States”) would exempt Austria from participating in military action 
in response to military aggression against another EU member state. As a last resort, Austria would 
use its sovereign veto to prevent any European Council decision that would demand military 
assistance for the target of such aggression.
This rigid, isolationist stance is paramount among all political parties. There was a brief period 
between 2000 and 2002 when the ruling coalition – comprising the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) 
and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and led by Wolfgang Schüssel – advocated a common 
defence clause for the EU. Joining NATO, as envisioned by the FPÖ and parts of the ÖVP in the 1990s, 
would have been political suicide given public resistance to the move. So, transforming the EU into a 
defence alliance would serve as a back door through which to finally make neutrality obsolete. 
However, the domestic debate shifted against any such endeavour due to left-wing populist opposition 
to Austria’s ‘militarisation’, the romanticisation of neutrality, growing anti-Americanism in the wake 
of the Iraq war, and increasing public discontent with the EU after the bloc opened accession talks 
with Turkey.
The conservative ÖVP (which is now a much more populist party than it once was) quickly ended its 
flirtation with deeper defence integration. And the FPÖ dropped out of government, split, collapsed 
into chaos, and eventually reconstituted itself around its national-socialist core, rejecting 
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internationalism of any sort. In this new form, the FPÖ came to love both neutrality and Russia even 
more fiercely than the left did.
On the domestic front, neutrality is popular across all parties. What was predominantly an issue for 
the left during the cold war became part of the national consensus, maintaining a steady approval 
rating of around 70 per cent. Therefore, the few Austrians who know that EU membership and 
neutrality are at odds with each other – mostly academics, diplomats, and security officials – dare not 
discuss this in public, as they fear the erosion of the minimal consensus on formal ESDP participation 
that lingers from the 1990s. Austria has commissioned little doctrinal or legal work on how it would 
behave if another member state demanded military assistance under Article 42.7. Pushing politicians 
to address the issue could backfire and deepen Austria’s isolation on defence issues within the EU.
Moreover, there is no established EU procedure for responding to such a call. When France asked for 
assistance after the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015, the EU Council held no dedicated meeting on how 
to provide this. Instead, France approached each EU member state individually to ask them what they 
intended to contribute. Unsurprisingly, Austria did not contribute anything. There was no big debate 
about this in Vienna – in effect, the country just looked the other way.
Meanwhile, there has been little debate on ‘strategic autonomy’ in Austria. Although anti-
Americanism is widespread in all Austrian parties, and Vienna was the member state capital most 
opposed to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, this has not translated into public 
support for the creation of independent European military capabilities. The Ministry of Defence tried 
to use the debate on strategic autonomy to advocate for more ambitious military contributions to EU 
missions (hoping that this would also lead to increased funding), but the discussion never went 
beyond bureaucratic politics and discussions between experts. Among the political class, the rationale 
that there is no need for an army always prevails.
Future policy
It is hard to predict how Austria will behave in any military scenario, because there is little policy 
debate on the issue. What debate there is involves bureaucratic politics: the foreign ministry and the 
armed forces try to use the EU’s agenda to ensure their own survival. But this debate, regardless of its 
nuances, does not reflect any foreign- or defence-policy ambition of the political class – which has 
none.
In the past two decades, the Ministry of Defence has been presided over by various socialist, 
conservative, and right-wing (FPÖ) ministers, who theoretically presented different visions for 
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defence. In practice, the ministry has done nothing apart from gradually abandon the military’s war-
fighting capabilities, while finance ministers have (regardless of their party) set increasingly 
restrictive budgetary limitations on the armed forces. Each minister tasked the defence bureaucracy 
with drafting and implementing reforms in line with the diminishing budget, prompting it to preserve 
offices, academies, committees, administrative staff, and events at the expense of war-fighting 
capabilities. The ministers’ justifications for the reforms varied according to their ideologies. But the 
end result was always the same.
This structural limitation would prevent Austria from changing its defence policy quickly, even if it 
wanted to. The country could not reconstitute the armed forces overnight simply by purchasing fancy 
equipment. The effectiveness of an armed force primarily depends on its soldiers and commanders – 
their training and tactical and operational versatility. As a result of limited funds and the short 
duration of conscription, the Austrian military has cut its manoeuvres to a minimum. At least one 
generation of officers have trained with just peacekeeping in mind, and have only heard about 
combined arms manoeuvres at the planning table or in wargames.
Furthermore, the Austrian armed forces have always lacked critical capabilities compared to NATO 
armies in areas such as air warfare (in all forms, including air-to-ground coordination), electronic 
warfare, and precision strike. Therefore, they could not operate in the same line as NATO ground or 
air forces. The official defence policy, regardless of the different ideological camps it may emerge 
from, merely serves as a smokescreen for unpreparedness. When Austria is in search of an excuse for 
this situation, a rigid interpretation of neutrality comes in handy.
If another EU member state asks for military assistance under Article 42.7, the key question in Vienna 
will concern not whether this is compatible with neutrality but whether the smokescreen will hold. In 
the case of an event that requires only a minimal, symbolic contribution (such as a terrorist attack), 
Austria may indeed consider making one. On terrorism, Austria once showed a kind of “neutrality” 
even towards the Islamic State group: it has turned a blind eye to the movement of fighters to Syria
and the presence of jihadist networks on its soil, in the hope that many of them will die fighting in the 
Middle East instead of posing problems at home. Nonetheless, the terrorist attack in Vienna in 
November 2020 exposed this negligence and has led to a certain change of course on domestic 
security.
But Austria would rely on neutrality to preserve the smokescreen in the case of more dramatic events, 
such as Russian tanks rolling into Finland or Turkish tanks into Cyprus (as they are not members of 
NATO, Finland and Cyprus could call for assistance from the EU under Article 42.7). Given its 
difficulties in dealing with even hybrid threats such as state-sponsored insurgent groups, Austria 
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would have to balance the risk that an aggressor would launch a retaliatory attack against it with 
pressure from its EU peers to show solidarity by granting military convoys the right to pass through 
its territory on the way to the theatre of operations. Depending on the specific circumstances of the 
crisis, Austria could passively tolerate collective defence operations by other EU member states or 
openly oppose them (such as by blocking measures in the European Council or refusing to allow 
access to its territory).
The Austrian public mood on these issues hardly matters, as Vienna does not foresee a scenario in 
which it would have to call for such assistance or solidarity from other EU members. Because it is 
surrounded by NATO states, Austria effectively rests its national defence strategy on other European 
countries and the US. If an aggressor shattered these defences and advanced towards the Austrian 
border, it would be too strong for Austria to fend off anyway. This is why Vienna sees free-riding as 
the most rational choice. Survival by luck worked for Austria during the cold war and has shaped its 
national security identity – and, for now, there is no prospect that this will change.
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Sovereignty concerns: Denmark’s opt-out from EU 
defence
Christine Nissen
EU member since: 1973
Opt-out of EU defence: 1993 following a referendum
Population: 5.8 million
Current defence spending as a share of GDP: Approximately 1.5 per cent planned for 
2021
Number of troops: 15,400 active and 44,200 reserve
Denmark’s special status: opting out of EU defence cooperation
Denmark’s exemption from the defence-related aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) gives it a unique perspective on EU security and defence issues. It appears an anomaly that 
Denmark has voluntarily and permanently opted out of EU defence cooperation. Denmark is not a 
neutral state and regards itself as being a principled foreign policy actor striving to make an assertive 
contribution to the international community, not least by making a considerable contribution to 
international military operations. Denmark also has a long history of engagement with European 
integration, having joined the European Union in 1973.
That said, concerns about the EU’s impact on national identity and a fear of losing sovereignty has 
long characterised the Danish perception of EU membership. This resistance is reflected in national 
referendums in which Danes have often voted ‘no’ to further EU integration. This was not least the 
case with the Maastricht Treaty’s aspirations of increased cooperation in policy areas where Denmark 
was particularly reluctant to surrender authority, including the creation of a common security and 
foreign policy. With its vote against the ratification of the treaty, Denmark came close to killing it 
entirely. To allow other members to move forward, EU heads of state made the Edinburgh Decision – 
which established several opt-outs for Denmark so that it could ratify the treaty.
The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework emerged a decade later, but 
Denmark was still unable to participate in EU military operations or in any decisions or planning in 
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this regard. The opt-out also prevented Denmark from participating in: the European Defence 
Agency, which the EU established in 2004 to help member states develop their military capabilities; 
the relevant CSDP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (which entered into force in 2009), including 
Article 42.7 on mutual defence; or in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which the bloc 
launched in 2017.
However, the opt-out is limited to activities that have both defence implications and a legal basis in 
the CFSP provisions of Articles 42-46 of the Treaty on European Union. Whether an activity has such 
implications is a matter of legal interpretation on a case-by-case basis, making the design of the opt-
out somewhat flexible. From the outset, Denmark has been able to take part in civilian CSDP missions.
The EU’s defence activities have recently moved beyond the CSDP by strengthening the role of the 
European Commission. Accordingly, Denmark has participated in new defence initiatives that have a 
non-CSDP legal basis. This includes initiatives such as the European Defence Fund, new cooperation 
on military mobility, and the European Peace Facility (which is designed to bolster external action on 
peace and security). Thus, the opt-out is not all-encompassing.
Denmark’s level of ambition and the mutual defence clause
Denmark finds itself in an odd position in efforts to strengthen EU integration, as the opt-out is 
constructed in such a way that the country has no influence over EU defence cooperation. The opt-out 
says that Denmark: “will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between member states 
in this area”. As it cannot block integration it has chosen to keep out of, Denmark has effectively 
reduced its power in the European Council at its own request. Thus, while the creators of the opt-out 
framed it as a way to retain sovereignty underpinned by legal guarantees, the measure de facto means 
that Denmark has lost strategic control over its participation in EU defence initiatives.
This loss of influence was evident when the Lisbon Treaty, including Article 42.7, entered into force. 
Since Danish scepticism centres on a fear that the EU will gain too much autonomy at the expense of 
NATO, Article 42.7 goes against Danish interests. Nevertheless, it was other member states that 
pushed for this measure. Moreover, since the clause is part of the legal articles that are explicitly 
covered by the opt-out, Article 42.7 article has very few implications for Denmark.
This might help explain why the article had no impact on the Danish public debate. But it has become 
the norm in the country only to discuss EU defence matters in a limited fashion – usually in ‘yes or no’ 
types of conversation that leave little space for nuance. One can ascribe the lack of debate on such 
matters to the opt-out, which discourages Danish voters, politicians, researchers, and civil servants 
Ambiguous alliance: Neutrality, opt-outs, and European defence – ECFR/402 16
from thinking about the union in relation to defence and security.
When the French president invoked in 2015 the mutual defence clause for the first time – following 
the Paris terrorist attacks – the Danish media hardly noticed. However, the French request elicited a 
surprising reaction from the Danish government. Following discussions at the EU Council to invoke 
Article 42.7, the Danish foreign ministry set out to explore whether Denmark could support France 
under the auspices of Article 42.7, despite the opt-out.  Here, the ministry’s legal service concluded 
that, if Denmark referred to Article 42.7 or even invoked it itself, this would not automatically activate 
the defence opt-out. The opt-out would only be triggered if the actions that followed the invocation of 
Article 42.7 were rooted in Articles 42-46 and had defence implications.  Article 42.7 allows states 
to engage in defence activities outside the EU context following its invocation. Accordingly, the 
Danish authorities concluded that any bilateral contribution to the French request would be 
unproblematic – even though the opt-out explicitly covers the mutual defence clause.
[1]
[2]
On 17 November 2015, Denmark stepped up its counter-terrorism operations in Mali at France’s 
request. The Danish Parliament decided to strengthen the country’s engagement with the UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, which Denmark had contributed to since 
its launch two years earlier. The Danish Parliament mentioned the EU – though not Article 42.7 – as a 
primary reference point for the mission. And the then-foreign minister, Kristian Jensen, hinted that 
the French request was one of the reasons why Denmark wanted to increase its involvement in the 
Sahel.[3]
Denmark’s response to the French invocation of Article 42.7 is in line with its broader approach to the 
debate on European ‘strategic autonomy’. By default, Denmark stands outside any type of increased 
EU defence cooperation. In practice, however, the country is keen to be a pragmatic partner on 
European security matters and will accommodate any such cooperation it sees as beneficial.
Generally, Denmark has been sceptical of the rhetorical aspects of the debate, although it largely 
agrees with its content. The country sees that there is an increasing need for the EU to be capable of 
protecting its international interests, not least when it comes to issues that go beyond military 
cooperation and territorial defence. Here, Denmark’s push for a broad use of EU policy tools reflects 
the complex pattern of threats Europe faces, in which insecurity stems not only from military affairs 
but also other areas of society, such as trade, technology, and critical infrastructure.
Copenhagen fears that strengthened European strategic autonomy could be interpreted as an 
alternative to NATO and the transatlantic relationship. Denmark has sought to adjust the language 
around the concept and limit references to it in European Council statements. The Danish position is 
that strategic autonomy should strengthen the transatlantic relationship and increase cooperation 
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with non-EU countries. As such, Denmark believes that the EU has good reasons to gain more 
autonomy and thereby take greater responsibility for security cooperation with the United States.
The future of Denmark’s special status
Despite the opt-out, Denmark has participated in the recent scenario-based exercises designed to test 
the mutual defence clause – the first of which, focused on hybrid warfare, occurred in January 2021, 
and was followed by two others. The exercises are designed to create a common understanding of the 
operationalisation and possible use of the clause. In this regard, Danish policymakers foresee difficult 
negotiations on EU defence cooperation in which they will have to figure out how to position their 
country.
The applicability of the opt-out has recently become a focus of attention once more due to this new 
impetus around Article 42.7, as well as EU defence initiatives such as PESCO, the European Defence 
Fund, and the European Peace Facility. However, the opt-out is likely here to stay. Prime Minister 
Mette Frederiksen, leader of the Social Democratic Party, has emphasised that she views opt-outs as 
“the bedrock of Denmark’s position” in the EU, and that her government sees no reason to reconsider 
the opt-out on defence. The government has also been significantly more sceptical of the EU than its 
predecessors have, all of which emphasised their ambition to end the defence opt-out when the time 
was right. But these governments have been unsuccessful whenever they have held a referendum on 
opt-outs – including those on the eurozone in 2000 and on justice and home affairs in 2015.
Traditionally, Danish governments have been restrictive in their application of the defence opt-out. 
But, curiously, the current government seems to be exploring ways to do more within the boundaries 
of the measure. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, because the opt-out is likely here to stay, the 
government wants to find a pragmatic solution in which Denmark can increase its room for 
manoeuvre on EU defence cooperation. Secondly, the EU has significantly strengthened its defence 
cooperation in recent years, and done so in a manner that allows Denmark to take part in many new 
initiatives. The country seems compelled to retain the opt-out as a sovereignty guarantee while 
participating in this expanded defence cooperation to some extent. Denmark wants to have its cake 
and eat it too.
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From neutrality to activism: Finland and EU defence
Tuomas Iso-Markku, Matti Pesu
EU member since: 1995
Neutral since: 1955 (changed status from neutrality to military non-alignment in the context 
of EU accession)
Population: 5.6 million
Current defence spending as a share of GDP: Approximately 1.9 per cent
Number of troops: 12,300 active and 280,000 reserve
The steady decline of neutrality and non-alignment
Finland’s accession to the European Union in 1995 marked a fundamental change in its foreign policy. 
From the mid-1950s to the early 1990s, the country pursued a policy of neutrality that put strict limits 
on its involvement in Western economic and political cooperation. More importantly, neutrality 
helped Finland to maintain a degree of distance from the Soviet Union. It strengthened Finland’s 
international position in the challenging cold war environment, providing the country with more 
room for manoeuvre during a time when Finnish foreign policy was largely conditioned on Moscow’s 
behaviour. Finnish neutrality was, above all, a political instrument – but it was internalised by 
Finnish policymakers and voters alike.
However, the Finnish foreign policy leadership quickly realised that Finland’s previous definition of 
neutrality had limited use after the end of the cold war – and that neutrality was largely incompatible 
with the nature and requirements of EU membership. As a result, Finland began to pursue a less 
restrictive policy of military non-alignment.
When it joined the EU, Finland expressed its full commitment to, and supported the development of, 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Moreover, during its first years of EU membership, 
Finland sought to shape the EU’s nascent security and defence policy. Despite its abandonment of 
strict neutrality, Finland was still averse to the (faint) possibility that the union’s security and defence 
policy would develop in the direction of territorial defence. Thus, Finland, along with Sweden, 
advocated a stronger EU role in crisis management – both to pre-empt the potential rise of a more 
traditional defence agenda within the EU and to demonstrate that the two countries were not neutral 
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oddballs but rather fully fledged and active EU members.
The evolution of the CFSP, including the Common Security and Defence Policy, pushed Finland to re-
evaluate its defence status in the late 2000s. The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 
2009, contained both the mutual assistance clause – Article 42.7 – and the solidarity clause. The 
introduction of Article 42.7 in particular implied that EU membership could entail territorial defence 
commitments. In 2007, anticipating the treaty, Finland’s new centre-right government came up with 
a definition of Finland’s defence status that better reflected the realities of the EU: a country that does 
not belong to any military alliance. The differences between the two definitions may appear to be 
purely semantic – indeed, military non-alignment and the newer definition are used interchangeably 
in the domestic debate. However, the change of status conveyed an important message: an EU 
member cannot be fully non-aligned politically or militarily.
Despite its new status, Finland’s policy remained largely unchanged. However, Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 prompted a major shift in Finnish 
security and defence policy. Although this Russian aggression in Ukraine was not a sufficient 
incentive for Finland to seek NATO membership, it significantly increased the country’s appetite for 
robust defence cooperation. Since 2014, Helsinki has updated old defence partnerships and forged 
new ones. The most important frameworks for Finland are its bilateral partnerships with both Sweden 
and the United States, the Nordic Defence Cooperation, its close partnership with NATO, and the 
security and defence dimension of the EU. In addition to these frameworks, Finland has joined new 
European ‘minilateral’ defence formats: the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, the French-driven 
European Intervention Initiative, and the German-initiated Framework Nations Concept.
This flurry of defence activity has created a new paradigm in which Finland uses such cooperation not 
only to strengthen its defence and deterrence but also to create the necessary preconditions for 
operational cooperation in times of crisis and war. Therefore, Finland has an alliance policy in all but 
name. In the last decade and a half, there has been a fundamental change in the practical implications 
of non-membership of any military alliance – as a result of which Finland has almost entirely stopped 
referring to this status in official foreign policy communications.
Finland as an EU defence activist
Finland’s pursuit of closer and deeper military collaboration with its partners has influenced its 
approach to the EU’s defence agenda. The paradigmatic change in Finnish defence thinking coincided 
with the EU’s efforts to boost its credibility as a security and defence actor following a European 
Council meeting in 2013 and, above all, the Brexit vote in 2016. Consequently, the formerly neutral 
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state has become one of the most vocal advocates of the EU’s security and defence efforts – and seems 
to have cast aside any residual neutralist sentiments and reservations. Today, Finland would readily 
accept a stronger EU role in territorial defence – in striking contrast to the country’s position in the 
1990s and 2000s.
Helsinki’s enthusiasm for EU defence manifests in its strong support for recent initiatives such as the 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, the European Defence Fund, the Military Planning and 
Conduct Capability, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the Strategic Compass. At the 
same time, these initiatives have not attracted significant attention in the country beyond a small 
circle of experts. Moreover, the initiatives have limited value to Finnish defence in the short term, as 
they neither strengthen Finland’s deterrence nor facilitate operational cooperation between EU 
member states’ armed forces – at least not in the context of territorial defence.
Two areas stand out in Finland’s efforts to shape the EU security and defence agenda. Firstly, Finland 
has tried to build up awareness of hybrid threats in the EU context, presenting itself as a “hybrid-
savvy” state with a functioning whole-of-society approach to security. The most tangible example of 
Finland’s activity in this field is the establishment in 2017 of the European Centre of Excellence for 
Countering Hybrid Threats, based in Helsinki. To date, 28 states – including Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom, and the US – have joined the centre, which also fosters cooperation between the EU 
and NATO. Countering hybrid threats featured prominently on Finland’s agenda for its presidency of 
the Council of the EU in the second half of 2019. During the presidency, EU ministers and working 
parties conducted scenario-based policy discussions on hybrid threats.
Secondly, Finland has often reminded its fellow member states of the importance of Article 42.7. The 
president of Finland has even called the clause “the true core of European defence”. According to 
Finnish thinking, the EU is a “security community” characterised by mutual solidarity and Article 42.7 
is a key element of the community. The 2020 Government Report on Foreign and Security policy 
states that “solidarity is of high security policy importance for Finland … Here, solidarity means that 
Finland will receive aid and assistance at its request, and that Finland will provide aid and assistance 
to another Member State or the European Union if necessary.” By stressing the importance of Article 
42.7, Finland does not seek to replace or replicate NATO’s Article 5. Rather, Finnish policymakers 
have suggested that the former could apply in a situation in which, for example, an EU member state 
becomes a victim of serious hybrid influencing. However, there has been no domestic debate about 
the scenarios in which Finland would seek to invoke Article 42.7.
In addition to rhetorical advocacy of the clause, Finland has reportedly bent over backwards to 
include references to Article 42.7 in key EU documents, such as the Council of the EU decision 
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establishing PESCO. When France, in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, invoked Article 
42.7 to request assistance from other EU members, Finnish policymakers recognised an opportunity 
to set an important precedent. Helsinki swiftly decided to provide assistance to Paris, albeit indirectly. 
Most notably, Finland deployed additional troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, thereby 
freeing up French troops for other tasks.
Finland’s advocacy of Article 42.7 reflects the evolution of its attitude towards EU defence since the 
early 2000s. When the mutual assistance clause emerged in the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
Finland did not oppose the idea of it per se but wanted to make sure that it would not involve 
automaticity in the provision of military assistance. However, after the EU eventually found an 
acceptable formulation, Finnish policymakers quickly adopted a rather positive stance on the clause 
and the idea of European solidarity more broadly. The Finnish Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, 
for example, stressed the article’s importance as a deterrent and called on it to amend legislation on 
providing and receiving military assistance. The government adopted the relevant legislative package 
in 2017, driven partly by the French request to activate Article 42.7 in 2015 and by advancing defence 
cooperation with Sweden.
Despite its active and positive approach to the evolution of the security and defence agenda in Europe, 
Finland has not articulated a clear vision of how this process should continue. Helsinki has adopted a 
somewhat ambiguous position in the lively debate on ‘strategic autonomy’ in the EU. Finland is 
strongly in favour of increasing Europe’s capacity to act in foreign, security, and defence matters. In 
the Finnish view, this should involve not only the EU but also initiatives such as the Joint 
Expeditionary Force, the Nordic Defence Cooperation, and the bilateral defence cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden. However, investing in autonomy should not mean weakening Europe’s global 
partnerships – particularly the transatlantic relationship. Instead, it should be about the EU and 
European countries taking more responsibility for their own security, thereby also heeding the US 
calls for greater burden sharing. Finland is less enthusiastic about the broadened interpretation of 
strategic autonomy, which extends to industrial policy and trade. With its small, export-orientated 
economy, Finland is wary of initiatives with protectionist elements. According to the Finnish 
government’s recent report on EU policy, the EU’s strategic autonomy “must be based on the 
development of [the union’s] own strengths, fair competition and participation in the global economy 
as well as on a more resolute promotion of the EU’s values and interests and on responsibility in 
external action”.
Future avenues of cooperation
Finland will likely continue to develop its new approach to defence cooperation. The country’s 
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geographic location next to an assertive Russia ensures that it has a lasting incentive to maintain a 
relatively strong defence capability. Given the power asymmetry between Finland and Russia, and the 
rising costs of defence materiel, it would be almost impossible for Helsinki to sustain a credible 
defence posture without extensive defence partnerships and networks. The EU’s evolving defence 
tools and other European initiatives will be central to the set of defence collaborations Finland uses to 
strengthen deterrence and prepare to respond to crises and conflicts. Finland is too small a player to 
shape the overall direction of the EU security and defence agenda, but it can lend its support to the 
initiatives of bigger member states, most notably France and Germany.
Despite its manifest willingness to intensify military cooperation, Finland is unlikely to re-evaluate its 
current status and join NATO in the short term – particularly given that it already has a host of 
interested partners that are willing to engage with it in developing deep, mutually beneficial 
cooperation. Significantly, Finland’s current model also serves NATO’s interests. Most Finns oppose 
NATO membership. And Finnish policymakers worry that the costs of Russian retaliation to Finland 
joining NATO would outweigh the benefits of doing so. Nevertheless, NATO membership will 
continue to be an option for Finland in the future, as Finnish policymakers are eager to stress. If 
Russia became increasingly aggressive or Sweden changed its attitude towards NATO membership, 
Finland would be forced to reconsider its current policy.
Currently, Finland’s official status as a non-member of a military alliance does not limit the country’s 
appetite for developing defence cooperation, be it the EU’s defence efforts or collaboration in smaller 
formats. A more militarily capable Europe would undoubtedly enhance Finland’s security. And 
Helsinki is ready to do its fair share to achieve that goal.
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Committed neutrality: Ireland’s approach to European 
defence cooperation
Clodagh Quain
EU member since: 1973
Neutral since: 1938 (Agreement with the UK)
Population: 4.9 million
Current defence spending as a share of GDP: Approximately 0.3 per cent
Number of troops: 8,750 active and 4,050 reserve
Military neutrality has long been a core concept in Irish foreign policy. While this policy is 
characterised by “non-membership” of military alliances and “non-participation in common or 
mutual defence arrangements”, Ireland has fulfilled its commitments to international peace and 
development efforts. As recently noted by the chair of the EU Military Committee, General Claudio 
Graziano, Ireland’s neutrality has not prevented it from fulfilling its responsibilities as part of UN- 
and EU-led missions. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has allowed Ireland to 
engage in a combination of cooperation and pragmatic abstention, in line with national positions.
Ireland’s neutrality is not enshrined in its constitution or laws, or in any international treaty. The 
country’s 2020 Programme for Government sets out a policy of “active military neutrality” that allows 
for the continuation of both a flexible and participative multilateral approach.
Ireland’s military neutrality gained political prominence during the second world war under 
Taoiseach Eamon de Valera. He announced on 19 February 1939 that Ireland would be neutral in the 
case of war. The Anglo-Irish agreement on trade, finance, and defence, which he signed on 25 April 
1938 with then UK prime minister Neville Chamberlain, was a significant development for Irish 
neutrality. As a trade agreement to end the economic war with Britain, it formalised the return of all 
port, aviation, and other defence facilities to the Irish government.
Several factors determined Ireland’s neutrality. In the context of Anglo-Irish relations, de Valera 
viewed neutrality as a means of self-determination and independence from British foreign policy. In 
the global context, the Irish government considered neutrality to be a pragmatic approach that kept 
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the state out of any potential war – as was necessary given Ireland’s insufficient defence and military 
structures.
Neutrality for Ireland has always meant non-membership of military alliances. The fact that Ireland is 
not a member of any such organisation has bolstered its credentials as a significant contributor to UN 
peacekeeping. Ireland opted not to join NATO when it was formed in 1949 because of several 
considerations, including a degree of discomfort about military cooperation with the UK while the two 
countries disputed the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.
Current engagement with European defence efforts
Engagement with the European Union is a hallmark of Irish defence policy, as stated in Ireland’s 2019 
White Paper on Defence. Neutrality is no obstacle to Ireland broadly participating in the CSDP. The 
country has been involved in several EU defence initiatives, including Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), the European Defence 
Fund (EDF), and military and civilian missions led by the bloc. Today, all Irish decision-making on 
the CSDP turns on a so-called ‘triple lock’ mechanism. In line with the Defence Acts, the Irish Defence 
Forces cannot be deployed to any conflict zone or CSDP mission without the approval of the UN, the 
government, and the Dail, the lower house of parliament.
On PESCO, Ireland participates in the Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance project. It is an observer on 
nine more PESCO projects, including military deployments for disaster relief, medical training, and 
cyber threats. The Irish Department of Defence and the Defence Forces continuously assess the value 
for Ireland of further participation in PESCO projects. Ireland participates fully in the European 
Defence Agency’s annual CARD, a review of military capabilities that is open to all member states on a 
voluntary basis. Ireland also contributes to the European Defence Fund, which provides a means to 
better coordinate and otherwise enhance national investments in defence. Simon Coveney, the 
minister for foreign affairs and minister for defence, has underlined the value of the EDF in helping 
increase “output” and jointly developing defence technology and equipment that states could not 
create alone.
As an off-budget mechanism, the European Peace Facility allows the EU to provide assistance to 
CSDP missions and operations. In negotiations to set up the facility, Ireland and like-minded states 
ensured that it included a safeguard to “constructively abstain” from assistance measures that involve 
lethal equipment. This approach reflected Ireland’s interests and the 2020 Programme for 
Government, which stated that Ireland “will not be part of decision-making or funding for lethal force 
weapons for non-peacekeeping purposes”. The EDF – which falls under the EU’s 2021-2027 
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Multiannual Financial Framework – does not provide funding for the development of lethal 
autonomous weapons, which are prohibited under international law. Ireland has consistently stated 
that weapon systems should remain under “meaningful human control”.
As a special status country, Ireland has made a strong commitment to EU military and civilian 
missions. This includes deployments of Defence Forces personnel to Operation Irini in the eastern 
Mediterranean, the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, and Operation Althea in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Ireland’s contributions also include the appointment of a senior Irish officer as the 
operational commander of the EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic in 
2007 and another as mission commander of EUTM Somalia in 2011 and 2013. In EU civilian 
missions, Ireland has deployed experts to Niger, Somalia, Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq, and Ukraine.
While Ireland is not a NATO member, it has participated in the NATO Partnership for Peace 
programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council since 1999. It also joined the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2019.
Ireland’s view of EU defence ambitions
From an Irish perspective, Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty did not turn the EU into a defence union 
as it avoided the development of a “common defence”. While the EU mutual assistance clause allows 
member states to provide “aid and assistance” in the case of an attack, it is intergovernmental and 
involves bilateral consultations with different states. Ireland, Finland, and Sweden can preserve their 
neutrality or military non-alignment in this framework.
In an Irish referendum on the treaty in June 2008, 53.4 per cent of participants voted ‘no’ after 
campaigners argued that that it could undermine Ireland’s military neutrality, making reference to 
Article 42.7. The European Council adopted in July 2009 a decision that provided guarantees to 
Ireland on defence matters. They included the discretion for countries with a traditional policy of 
neutrality “to determine the nature of aid or assistance” in the case of armed aggression on the 
territory of another member state. Another safeguard for Ireland included a requirement for a 
unanimous decision of the European Council for “any decision to move to a common defence”.
This safeguard clause under Article 42.7 addressed the concerns of Irish voters about safeguarding the 
traditional policy of neutrality. As part of this mutual assistance clause, the article is prefaced by the 
statement that it “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States”. The Italian proposal to include this language at the drafting stage was 
preferable to an opt-in provision, which would have required a full commitment to the mutual 
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assistance clause.
The agreed mutual assistance clause involved a broad compromise between three groups of states: 
those seeking mutual defence; those protecting a traditional policy of neutrality and non-alignment 
(Ireland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden); and those keen not to affect NATO. Importantly, it 
illustrated how the CSDP accommodated special status countries. In a second Irish referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty, held in October 2009, 67.1 per cent of participants voted ‘yes’.
When France invoked Article 42.7 following the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, Ireland 
supported this decision and offered to provide any assistance that it could, in line with the safeguard 
clause. There was only a limited public debate to the response under Article 42.7 in Ireland. But the 
country increased its contribution to EUTM Mali in mid-June 2016 and June 2017, with the result 
that it eventually provided a total of 20 personnel to the mission.
The debate on European ‘strategic autonomy’ in Ireland is mainly an expert-led discussion. While the 
term still lacks resonance in the public debate, the Irish government has shown an interest in 
discussing strategic autonomy (even though the meaning of the term is contested). Views on EU 
defence policy and neutrality vary between Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, the Green Party, and Sinn Fein. 
Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, partners in the coalition government, favour EU defence cooperation 
within existing safeguards, which they see as preserving Ireland’s special status. The Green Party, 
another partner in the government, opposes an expansion of PESCO in areas “not compatible with 
Ireland’s non-aligned and peacekeeping defence tradition”. Sinn Fein adopts a narrow interpretation 
of neutrality that opposes increased EU defence efforts.
Future deliberations
There is no public debate on invoking Article 42.7 in Ireland but, in principle, the country could call 
on other EU member states to provide security assistance in extreme circumstances for air policing, 
cyber defence, and maritime surveillance. However, Ireland’s preference for addressing security 
matters bilaterally could preclude such a decision.
There is relatively little prospect of armed aggression on Ireland’s territory, due to the character of 
emerging threats the country faces. Nonetheless, Ireland’s growing role as a hub for data centres 
following Brexit, and the implications of a cyber attack for global security, suggest that country should 
develop greater cyber defence capabilities. This is reflected in Ireland’s cyber security strategy for 
2019-2024, which states that there is a “clear need” to develop engagement with cyber security across 
the EU. Analysts Sara Myrdal and Mark Rhinard argue that cyber attacks could, in theory, trigger 
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both Article 42.7 and the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union). However, the possibility of invoking either of these articles in the case of cyber 
attacks has not been widely discussed in Ireland.
While Ireland’s special status may evolve, it is unlikely to abandon its policy of neutrality in the short 
term. Nonetheless, the country continues to cooperate with other member states effectively on CSDP 
initiatives via safeguards and constructive abstentions.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author, and not the Institute of International and 
European Affairs.
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Pragmatic neutrality: Malta’s view of EU defence
Roderick Pace
EU Member since: 2004
Neutral since: 1987 (enshrined in the Constitution and Malta’s EU accession treaty)
Population: 515,000
Current defence spending as a share of GDP: approximately 0.6 per cent
Number of troops: 1,700 Active + 260 Reserve
Malta wrote neutrality into its Constitution in 1987 following negotiations between the Nationalist 
Party and the Labour Party – the only political groups to have won seats in the national Parliament 
since independence in 1964, and in the European Parliament since Malta joined the European Union 
in 2004.
Article 1.3 of the Constitution specifies that “Malta is a neutral state actively pursuing peace … by 
adhering to a policy of non-alignment and refusing to participate in any military alliance.” The article 
defines neutrality as precluding foreign military bases on Malta’s territory and foreign forces’ use of 
military facilities there – except at the request of the Maltese government in relation to decisions by 
the UN Security Council, the need for self-defence, or threats to Malta’s independence, sovereignty, 
and neutrality. The Constitution allows for the deployment of small contingents of foreign troops to 
assist “in the performance of civil works or activities”. Maltese shipyards are permitted to construct 
military vessels and repair those that are not in combat. Nonetheless, the shipyards are off-limits to 
the military vessels of Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, and of the United States.
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The inclusion of the neutrality clause in the Constitution stemmed from a review a parliamentary 
select committee launched in 1985, amid a political crisis. Following several meetings behind the 
scenes, the government announced in 1987 an agreement that consisted of two elements: the 
neutrality clause and a provision that, in any general election, a party that obtains more than 50 per 
cent of the first-count votes is entitled to an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. The latter 
provision was intended to avoid a repeat of the 1981 election result, in which the Labour Party won an 
absolute parliamentary majority with fewer votes than the Nationalist Party. This form of revision, 
which excludes the people from the debate, has become the only means through which to change the 
Constitution.
Neutrality and EU membership
Malta embarked on a policy of neutrality and non-alignment following the closure of UK military 
bases on its soil in 1979. Parliament approved a solemn declaration of neutrality on 14 May 1981. 
Malta cut and pasted this declaration and the 1987 neutrality clause inserted into the Constitution 
from the bilateral Neutrality Treaty it concluded with Italy in 1980.
A year later, Malta reached a neutrality accord with the Soviet Union, which expressed “its readiness 
to consult with the Government of Republic of Malta (GRoM) on questions directly affecting the 
interests of the two countries, including the neutral status of Malta, and in case of situations arising 
which create a threat to peace and security or the violation of international peace, will also be 
prepared, as necessary, and at the request of the GRoM and by agreement between the parties, to 
enter into contact with it so as to coordinate their positions in order to remove the threat or to 
establish peace.”
During its EU accession negotiations, Malta confirmed that its neutrality would not be an obstacle to 
the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). But neutrality became a highly charged and symbolic issue in the national 
debate on membership: the Labour Party argued that EU membership undermined Malta’s neutrality, 
while the Nationalist Party disagreed. In Declaration 35 of the Treaty of Accession, Malta affirmed its 
commitment to the CFSP as set out in the Treaty on European Union. The declaration also affirmed 
that Malta’s participation in the CFSP did not prejudice its neutrality because, as the treaty specified, 
any European Council decision to move to a common defence would have to be unanimous and had to 
“be adopted by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”.
The government described Declaration 35 as an additional safeguard that was necessary to allay 
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public concerns, given that neutrality is an integral part of the Maltese identity. The Labour Party, 
however, stressed that EU treaties would oblige Malta to support the CSDP in good faith and that 
“constructive abstention” was unlikely to work well.
Mutual defence
The Labour Party was probably the first to highlight the fact that mutual defence could conflict with 
Malta’s definition of neutrality. Members of the EU initially raised the idea of mutual defence in 2002 
at the Convention on the Future of Europe – which both Maltese political parties attended. And a 
mutual defence clause featured in the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.
Following Malta’s accession to the EU, the Labour Party began to support membership of the bloc, 
helping create a national consensus on the issue. However, the two parties adopted different stances 
on neutrality. When in July 2004 Malta announced that it would join the European Defence Agency, 
the Labour Party retorted by pledging to leave the agency as soon as it was regained power (a 
commitment that it would quietly forget). However, Malta encountered other difficulties in the CSDP: 
since it had suspended its participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1996, and did not rejoin 
the initiative until 2008, it could not fully participate in the EU-NATO Berlin+ arrangements in 2004. 
After 2008, the country began to participate in several CSDP missions. While Malta did not join 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2018, it maintained the option of joining later.
The need for constitutional changes
In the last two decades, the Nationalist Party and the Labour Party have reached a consensus on the 
need to rewrite the neutrality provisions in the Constitution, but neither has tabled a proposal for how 
to do so. Although both parties accept neutrality, their conceptions of it differ: the Labour Party does 
not want Malta to fully participate in what it perceives to be the further militarisation of the EU, while 
the Nationalist Party is against “neutralisation” and favours “active neutrality”. As a Nationalist Party 
deputy prime minister wrote in 2010, “being neutral does not mean, as Churchill once remarked, 
being neutral between the fire and the firefighters”.
The position Malta adopted during the 2011 Libyan crisis probably satisfies both parties as a model 
for future engagement. Then, Malta did not join NATO’s campaign or allow the alliance to use its 
territory for military operations, but instead focused on humanitarian missions. At the same time, the 
country did not refrain from criticising the Qaddafi government for its violence against civilians. And 
it publicly supported an EU Council statement that the regime had lost its legitimacy. In August 2011, 
Malta recognised the Benghazi-based Libyan Transitional Council as the legitimate government of the 
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Libyan people.
In the shadow of Article 42.7
The apparent contradiction between neutrality and EU mutual defence characterised Malta’s 
parliamentary debates both on the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Lisbon 
Treaty. In 2005 the Labour Party, which had just adopted a more pro-EU stance and thereby won 
three seats in the European Parliament, opted for the ratification of the draft treaty. Simultaneously, 
however, it still wanted to preserve its support for neutrality and win over internal opponents of 
ratification. Labour’s parliamentary group agreed to support the draft treaty in Parliament, but to 
subject the vote to a condition that a Labour government would reverse any decision that it saw as 
undermining neutrality. A general conference of the party delegates endorsed the parliamentary 
group’s position, based on the understanding that the Constitutional Treaty “does not prejudice 
Malta’s constitutional neutrality”.
The group quoted legal advice indicating that the safeguards on neutrality that Malta had secured in 
the Accession Treaty were still valid under the draft European constitution. The group voted in favour 
of the Constitutional Treaty on the condition that, as it spelt out in a document submitted with the 
vote, “from a legal standpoint, Malta will not be bound in any way by commitments to mutual or 
common defence … Malta will not be obliged to join any effort aiming at the creation of a European 
Army. The participation of Maltese contingents from the Armed Forces in CSDP missions will 
continue to be defined in accordance with the provisions of the Maltese Constitution.”
In a 2008 parliamentary debate, the Labour Party voted in favour of the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification 
but expressed the same reservations that it had in 2005.
Article 42.7 in practice
When France invoked Article 42.7 following the Paris attacks of November 2015, the Maltese prime 
minister made a lengthy statement in Parliament dwelling mostly on the implications for Malta’s 
security and the safety measures needed to prepare for the Commonwealth Summit in Valletta later 
that month. A few days later, the government stated that, if France specifically asked Malta for help, 
the latter was ready to meet this request in line with the Maltese Constitution and EU treaties. The 
government added that it “had been advised by the Advocate General that the fact that an EU member 
state requests help on the basis of provisions in the Lisbon Treaty does not entail or does not 
necessarily lead to actions that infringe the neutrality clauses as protected by the Maltese 
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Constitution.”
European strategic autonomy
The idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ has not caught on in Malta’s public debate, although it has been 
broached in some of the local academic literature. References to the concept in official ministerial 
statements relate to economic and trade objectives, but not to political or defence integration.
Conclusion
The Maltese Parliament discussed EU mutual defence during the ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, but the issue has not made a perceptible impact on the public debate. 
One Labour MEP consistently criticises, and abstains from votes on, resolutions in the European 
Parliament that he sees as militarising the union and thereby impinging on Malta’s neutrality. He also 
opposes Malta’s involvement in the EU’s development of its defence and military policy. Malta has not 
joined PESCO or the European Intervention Initiative. However, there are indications that the 
country is committed to active neutrality: it remains in the European Defence Agency and participates 
in CSDP military and civilian missions. The creation of deployable military capabilities is one of the 
objectives listed in the Armed Forces of Malta Strategy Paper 2016-2026.
As indicated by its reaction to France’s invocation of Article 42.7 in 2015, the Maltese government 
takes a pragmatic approach to the article and does not consider itself to have joined a military alliance 
or a defence union. At the time, the government referred to legal advice that responding to such a 
request would not necessarily violate the neutrality clauses protected by the Constitution. 
Accordingly, Malta would be prepared to ask for assistance from other member states in similar 
circumstances. But no Maltese government has ever publicly discussed the scenarios in which it could 
make such a request.
The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the University of Malta or the Institute for 
European Studies.
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From neutrality to solidarity: Sweden and EU security 
and defence policy
Calle Hakansson
EU member since: 1995
Neutral since: 1945 (militarily non-aligned since 2002)
Population: 10 million
Current defence spending as a share of GDP: Approximately 1.3 per cent
Number of troops: 35,000 active (15,000 standing; 20,000 Swedish Home Guard) and 
11,500 reserve
Sweden is still widely perceived as a neutral country. This view is based on a history of the country’s 
neutrality that has become deeply embedded in the Swedish identity. However, when it joined the 
European Union in 1995, Sweden began the process of ending its neutrality. The country decided to 
join the EU – a political alliance – mainly due to economic rather than security considerations.
Nonetheless, European integration has affected Sweden’s discussions on its neutrality policy. In 2002, 
after cross-party consultations in the Swedish Parliament, the government declared that Sweden was 
militarily non-aligned and that neutrality had served it well in the past. A Swedish cross-party defence 
commission subsequently stated that Sweden was unlikely to stay neutral if another EU country came 
under attack. This standpoint was informed by the EU’s constitutional process that culminated in the 
Lisbon Treaty. In 2007 and 2008, the defence commission said that Sweden should adopt a 
declaration of solidarity with the rest of the EU and with other Nordic states (as Norway and Iceland 
are not members of the bloc). The defence commission also echoed the European Council’s 
declaration of solidarity that followed the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid. As a consequence, the 
2009 Swedish Defence Bill adopted the Swedish solidarity declaration and thereby abolished 
Sweden’s neutrality.
Sweden’s unilateral statement of solidarity stresses that the country “will not remain passive if 
another EU Member State or a Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these 
countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected. We must therefore be able to both give and 
receive support, civilian as well as military.” Nonetheless, the current government recently declared
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that “Sweden’s security policy remains firmly in place. Our non-participation in military alliances 
serves us well and contributes to stability and security in northern Europe. It requires an active, 
broad, and responsible foreign and security policy combined with enhanced defence cooperation – 
particularly with Finland – and credible national defence capabilities”.
Sweden and European security and defence cooperation
However, Sweden’s military non-alignment has affected its willingness to push for the institutional 
reform of EU security and defence policy. Sweden has often been hesitant to engage with such policy. 
And the country has closely aligned itself with the United Kingdom in the past. Nonetheless, Sweden 
has been very active in EU missions and operations, including every military and civilian mission 
under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Sweden was also instrumental in establishing
the civilian CSDP in the early 2000s. Similarly, Stockholm worked with Berlin to push forward a new 
civilian CSDP Compact in 2018. Sweden will also have a strong focus on the civilian dimensions of the 
CSDP in the EU’s Strategic Compass process, as well as during its 2023 EU presidency.
Sweden participates in six projects under Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and is an 
observer in 11 others. The country joined eight projects now under the European Defence Fund (EDF) 
through its precursors, the Preparatory Action on Defence Research and the European Defence 
Industrial Development Programme. Sweden could benefit from the development of the EDF, as it 
has a large defence-industrial base (being one of the Letter of Intent countries, together with France, 
Germany, the UK, Spain, and Italy). But Sweden’s industrial base is privately owned, partly by non-
EU entities. Hence, opening up PESCO and the EDF to third states and non-EU companies has been a 
priority for Sweden. While the EDF and PESCO could now be formally open to such companies, there 
is still some uncertainty about how they can participate in these new EU initiatives.
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However, such initiatives – along with the political effects of Brexit – have started to reduce Sweden’s 
traditional scepticism about EU defence cooperation. Sweden has expressed an ambition to be at the 
core of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. And, in the last couple of years, the country has 
strengthened its bilateral and multilateral security and defence policy cooperation with several large 
European states – the UK, France, and Germany. Sweden has joined all these countries’ multilateral 
defence initiatives, including the UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force, Germany’s Framework Nations 
Concept, and the French-led European Intervention Initiative. Sweden has recently made a great 
effort to enhance its defence cooperation with Finland especially, along with Norway, the United 
States, and NATO (since 2014 as an enhanced opportunity partner of the alliance). Moreover, when it 
participated in NATO exercise Trident Juncture 18, Sweden stressed that this was grounded in its 
declaration of solidarity.
Sweden and Article 42.7
Sweden developed its own declaration of solidarity in parallel with the EU’s mutual assistance clause, 
Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty. There was a rather limited initial debate among Swedish politicians 
on the inclusion of Article 42.7 in the treaty (in which the Green Party argued that the Lisbon Treaty 
eroded Swedish military non-alignment). Nonetheless, so far, Sweden has been rather reluctant to 
operationalise and define Article 42.7. However, Stockholm has stated that the declaration does not 
imply an automatic security guarantee, as Sweden would need to assess its response to calls for 
assistance according to the merits of individual cases.
Developments in the past couple of years have led to a greater European debate on Article 42.7. EU 
institutions have become more involved in related issues; for instance, the European External Action 
Service published a ‘scoping paper’ on hybrid threats and the article (after France published one on its 
experiences in the area). The Political and Security Committee has also discussed Article 42.7 and 
tested it through exercises.  France, Germany, Spain, and Italy have stressed their desire to work on 
the operationalisation of Article 42.7, mainly through regular scenario-based discussions and 
exercises – an idea the Council of the European Union also raised in its June 2020 conclusions. 
Hence, these discussions and exercises proceeded under the Political and Security Committee in 
spring 2021 and will feed into the development of the Strategic Compass.  France is widely expected 
to focus on the operationalisation of Article 42.7 during its EU presidency in 2022, just as Finland did 
during its 2019 presidency.
[4]
[5]
Although it is Finland’s most important defence partner, Sweden remains less keen than its neighbour 
to discuss and develop Article 42.7. Arguably, Stockholm should become more engaged in the debate, 
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especially given that there has been almost no public discussion in Sweden on the implications of 
triggering the article.
Sweden may not be eager to discuss the operationalisation of Article 42.7, but it views the clause as 
important to EU security. Following the first activation of the article – by France, following the 2015 
Paris terrorist attacks – Sweden declared that it was important to act in solidarity with other EU 
member states. Stockholm stated that the “Swedish declaration of solidarity occupies a central 
position in Sweden’s security policy” and that “Swedish support for France … contributes to the 
credibility of Article 42 (7) of the EU Treaty and European security policy as a whole … Sweden 
therefore has a foreign and security policy interest in providing requested support to France’’.
Accordingly, Sweden was one of the first countries that offered support to France, including by 
providing 100 hours of flying time from the Swedish quota in the multilateral cooperation for strategic 
air transport (the Strategic Airlift Capability). Sweden also deployed additional staff officers to UN-led 
missions and provided tactical air transport to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Mali. Sweden also sold
precision bombs for fighter aircraft to France after the latter faced shortages in the fight against the 
Islamic State group and other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. However, in the Swedish political
debate, the centre-right opposition also wanted Sweden to offer to deploy the Jas Gripen fighter in the 
campaign (in a move resembling Swedish involvement in the 2011 intervention in Libya).
The European Defence Union and the EU’s quest for strategic 
autonomy
In his 2017 state-of-the-union speech, then-European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker 
argued that Europe needed to establish a fully fledged European Defence Union by 2025. His 
successor, Ursula von der Leyen, has also expressed this sentiment. Sweden is uncomfortable with the 
idea and has focused on the intergovernmental character of the EU’s security and defence policy. In 
line with this, the Swedish government initially expressed reservations about the European 
Commission’s 2016 defence action plan and has tried to nuance the discussions on the European 
Defence Union in the Council of the European Union.[6]
The EU’s discussions of ‘strategic autonomy’ have also been challenging from a Swedish perspective. 
While the debate on strategic autonomy initially focused on security and defence following the 
publication of the 2016 EU Global Strategy, it has since broadened to include issues such as trade and 
economics, health, climate, and digitalisation. Within the Swedish political system, there is a broad 
scepticism about the idea.  Nonetheless, as ‘strategic autonomy’ has become the leading buzzword 
in Brussels, Sweden has started to take a more pragmatic approach towards the concept, with the aim 
[7]
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of influencing the overall direction of policy based on it.  As the Swedish minister for EU affairs, 
Hans Dahlgren, explained: ‘‘in some areas, strategic autonomy must be protected without the EU 
turning inwards’’.
[8]
Nonetheless, on security and defence, Sweden has been very hesitant to adopt the concept. The 
government recently argued that strategic autonomy should not mean “that the EU closes itself to the 
outside world or reduces cooperation with partner countries … The transatlantic relationship should 
be safeguarded.” Similarly, Sweden has tried to nuance European Council discussions and conclusions 
on strategic autonomy.  However, the Swedish government argues that Europe needs to take 
greater responsibility for its own security, emphasising the idea that “EU security and defence 
cooperation shall contribute to the Union being able to carry out the full range of civilian and military 
crisis management operations, including the most demanding … with our partners whenever possible, 
and on its own if necessary”. Nonetheless, foreign involvement in Sweden’s defence industry and the 
country’s commercial and political ties to the UK and the US strongly influence the Swedish approach 
to strategic autonomy. The Swedish defence minister, Peter Hultqvist, stated that Sweden ‘’opposes 




Sweden is active in EU missions, including civilian CSDP operations, and strongly supported the 
development of the EU Global Strategy. But the country will likely remain lukewarm on the EU’s 
development of its defence policy. While the post-Brexit political landscape has started to ease this 
scepticism, Sweden tries to take a balanced approach to its promotion of various national interests 
(such as those related to EU defence-industrial development and to discussions on the European 
Defence Union and strategic autonomy). Yet, hopefully, the development of the EU’s Strategic 
Compass will create a more frank and open Swedish discussion on the operationalisation of Article 
42.7, as well as on the European Defence Union.
Meanwhile, the Swedish political debate on NATO is set to continue, as most MPs have now stated 
that Sweden should refer to the option of joining the alliance in its foreign policy declarations. Such 
an option, similar to Finland’s, would signal Sweden’s intent to seek NATO membership if its security 
situation deteriorated. However, the Swedish government has argued that joining NATO would 
destabilise this situation in itself.
Meanwhile, a continued lack of EU-UK cooperation on foreign and security policy is challenging from 
a Swedish perspective. Some Swedish MPs argue that their country should expand its unilateral 
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declaration of solidarity to the UK. The government has responded by saying that it will develop its 
bilateral security and defence relations with the UK while also continuing to support stronger EU-UK 
relations.[10]
Ambiguous alliance: Neutrality, opt-outs, and European defence – ECFR/402 39
The incomplete European Defence Union
Clara Cramer, Ulrike Franke
Three main factors shaped the role of special status states in a European Union with growing military 
ambitions. Firstly, there have always been some European leaders who want the EU to become a fully-
fledged defence alliance – although interest in this idea has ebbed and flowed over the years. 
Secondly, the contradictions between these ambitions and the accession to the EU of neutral or non-
aligned states initially caused quarrels but, every time, they were resolved through innovative legal 
compromises. Any remaining incompatibilities were either ignored or accepted. Thirdly, the 
membership of the special status countries in an increasingly ambitious EU has always been 
characterised by great ambiguity: special status states have been ambivalent about their role in the 
EU’s increasing defence ambitions. And the union has been ambiguous in its requests for member 
states to make defence commitments. All the while, the EU has moved forward with its defence efforts 
– most notably through the introduction of the mutual defence clause, Article 42.7, into the Lisbon 
Treaty – while not placing too much emphasis on the possible dilemmas they pose for special status 
states.
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The insightful contributions from the national experts collected in this publication confirm this 
ambiguity, and reveal a striking incoherence in the relationship between the special status states and 
the EU’s defence policy. Such incoherence makes it difficult to imagine how the EU could become an 
actual defence alliance – in which member states act as security guarantors for one another – while it 
includes several countries that may regard themselves as being, in some respects, outside the alliance.
There are significant differences between the special status states’ respective commitments to 
European defence, their engagement with the union’s new initiatives, and their expectations of EU 
mutual defence. They are situated along a continuum that includes highly committed and militarily 
capable states that appear to be non-aligned only on paper, as well as those that are assertively 
neutral, militarily weak, and reliant on others for their security. Broadly, the six states discussed in 
this publication fall into one of three groups: the “non-aligned in name only” (Finland and Sweden); 
the “odd one out” (Denmark); and the “strategic schnorrers” (Ireland, Malta, and Austria).
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Non-aligned in name only
In the first group, Finland and Sweden have shown how a capable European Defence Union might be 
functional even if some of its members maintained their special statuses. Sweden and Finland do not 
behave as though they are militarily non-aligned. Tuomas Iso-Markku and Matti Pesu describe 
Finland as “one of the most vocal advocates of the EU’s security and defence efforts”. And Calle 
Hakansson points out that a Swedish cross-party defence commission concluded that Sweden was 
unlikely to stay neutral if another EU country came under attack. Fittingly, the titles the authors chose 
for their contributions, “From neutrality to activism” (Finland) and “From neutrality to solidarity” 
(Sweden), reflect the fact that, in these countries, the meaning of neutrality has changed over time. 
Indeed, Sweden recently adopted a position that made it possible for the country to eventually join 
NATO. If they were to abandon non-alignment officially, this would be symbolically important but 
would not change much in practical terms. For both countries, the concept of solidarity – which, in 
Sweden, is enshrined in its 2009 Defence Bill – implies that they would assist a fellow EU member 
state that had become a victim of armed aggression, and that they expect the same in return. Thus, 
despite the fact that Article 42.7’s ‘Irish clause’ was written with these states in mind, Finland and 
Sweden do not appear to regard it as applying to them. Both states also supported France in 2015 
following the Paris terror attacks. Still, according to Hakansson, Sweden is only “lukewarm” about the 
union’s attempts to enhance and further institutionalise the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). Nonetheless, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the union has reduced Sweden’s 
traditional hesitancy about EU defence cooperation.
Importantly, both Finland and Sweden have comparatively significant military capabilities. Finland’s 
defence budget accounts for almost 2 per cent of GDP, the NATO requirement that most members of 
the alliance struggle to fulfil. Sweden reactivated conscription in 2017, and is currently planning its 
largest increase in defence spending in 70 years.
The odd one out
Denmark is the odd one out among the special status states, as it is not neutral but has opted out of 
EU security and defence as a result of a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. Denmark is included in 
this publication because the country’s status raises some of the same questions as do those of the 
other five, neutral, states – most importantly, in relation to how the EU can develop a common 
defence union when only some of its members buy into the idea.
From the perspective of the EU, the Danish opt-out seems preferable to neutrality – though that is not 
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necessarily the case for the country itself. Christine Nissen shows that Denmark’s fear of losing 
sovereignty as part of the EU, which motivated the opt-out decision in 1993, has led to its 
marginalisation on defence matters. While the Danes are free of the defence elements of Articles 42-
46 of the Treaty on European Union, they have effectively deprived themselves of any influence on the 
development of the CSDP. In 2015 Denmark supported France by enhancing its engagement with 
counter-terrorism operations in Mali. Denmark did not officially state that this enhanced engagement 
came in response to the invocation of the mutual defence clause, but the Danish government’s legal 
service concluded that, since an invocation of Article 42.7 only implies bilateral assistance and does 
not involve decisions made within the EU institutions, the help the country provided to France was 
“unproblematic”. The legal service also stated that Denmark could invoke Article 42.7 itself.
Thus, despite having a formal opt-out from all European defence initiatives, Denmark might still 
expect fellow member states to provide aid if it became the victim of armed aggression. Through its 
support for France in 2015, Denmark showed that it would be willing to come to other states’ rescue – 
even though it avoided linking its support specifically to the invocation of the mutual defence clause. 
According to Nissen, the Danish opt-out is “likely here to stay”. For the EU, this appears to be less 
problematic than some of the other states’ stances, because the opt-out prevents Denmark from 
interfering with further EU defence integration.
The strategic schnorrers
The third group brings together the most diverse – and, for the EU’s defence ambitions, most 
problematic – group of states. Ireland, Malta, and Austria all have very limited military capabilities. 
Their defence spending ranges from Ireland’s 0.3 per cent of GDP to Malta’s and Austria’s 
approximately 0.6 per cent of GDP – and they seem unlikely to increase this in the near future. This is 
despite the fact that, as participants in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Austria and 
Ireland have committed to regularly increasing their defence budgets. For the three countries, the 
Irish clause is crucial – not just as an opt-out for their contribution: Clodagh Quain reasons that it is 
due to this safeguard that Ireland did not perceive the inclusion of Article 42.7 in the Lisbon Treaty as 
indicating the EU was becoming a defence union.
The strategic schnorrers are the least coherent group, due to the differences between them in their 
levels of willingness to participate in European defence efforts and their reasons for neutrality. 
Ireland’s neutrality has to be understood in light of its experiences of a bloody war of independence 
and a civil war. The country has fewer than 10,000 active troops, but has in recent years punched 
above its weight in EU military and civilian missions. With some of these troops currently deployed to 
Mali, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Mediterranean, and several other regions, Ireland has shown a 
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commitment to such missions.
Malta is less active than Ireland in European defence. While it participates in some EU missions with 
a very small number of personnel and mainly for humanitarian purposes, it did not join PESCO. The 
fact that Article 42.7 only provides for “bilateral assistance” explains why Malta would have aided 
France in 2015 if the latter had requested it, and why Malta would also expect other EU member 
states to support it in the case of an attack. More than their counterparts in other neutral states, the 
Maltese political elite appears to be divided over their country’s future relationship with the CSDP and 
the EU’s defence ambitions. A major change in Malta’s policy is unlikely, given the prevailing 
disagreements between the country’s two main political parties; one warning of “neutralisation” – an 
overly rigorous insistence on neutrality – and the other accusing the EU of “militarisation”. Given 
Malta’s size, one could argue that it hardly matters for EU defence whether the country is highly 
involved and capable or sits on the side-lines. Still, as with the other neutral states, Malta could create 
uncertainty due to its position within the EU but partly outside a mutual defence union.
Of all the special status states, Austria appears to be the most problematic for a European Defence 
Union. According to Gustav Gressel, Austria has systematically abandoned any practical combat 
readiness in recent decades. The country tries “to limit [EU defence] ambitions, lest Austria reveal its 
weakness in military matters”. Austria just “looked the other way” when France invoked Article 42.7, 
and did not increase its minimal contribution to the Mali operation as it had committed to do before 
the Paris attacks. The country appears set to either “passively tolerate collective defence operations by 
other EU member states or openly oppose them” following a future invocation of the article. 
Therefore, if an EU member state comes under attack, it could not count on support from Austria. 
Indeed, some experts even wonder whether the country would deny the use of its airspace or land 
corridors for military transport, as it did during the Iraq war.
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Overall, despite their shared reticence or inability to be part of a defence union, the special status 
states differ significantly in their military capabilities, commitment to EU defence efforts, and 
interpretation of their situation. However, as the contributors to this essay collection argue, none of 
these states is likely to abandon their special status any time soon. Some, such as Austria and Ireland, 
may not see any reason to do so. But even those that are non-aligned only on paper are unlikely to 
change their status. An important reason for this reticence appears to be public opinion – and 
national referendums such as that in Denmark have played an important role in this. Polls in the six 
countries discussed show broad public support for maintaining the status quo – particularly in 
Austria, but also in Finland, Ireland, and other neutral states. One scholar even speaks of a two-level 
game in which the political elites of neutral states agree to EU measures that may end or otherwise 
affect neutrality while, domestically, they face voters that wish to retain this neutrality.
The implications for a “fully fledged defence union”
This essay collection has shown that the uncertainty surrounding the six states discussed could 
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impede efforts to develop the EU into a true defence union or alliance. It is unsurprising that none of 
these countries defines the EU as a defence alliance, given that to do otherwise would reveal the 
inherent contradictions of their membership. Still, the essays confirm that it should be inherently 
problematic for neutral and non-aligned states to be part of a union with a mutual defence clause. As 
Quain points out, the Irish defence ministry states that Ireland’s neutrality is characterised by “non-
participation in common or mutual defence arrangements”, which the EU clearly possesses. Gressel 
spells out this contradiction most clearly: “Austria is not allowed to join a defensive military alliance 
(one with a common defence clause such as Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty or NATO’s Article 5)”. 
The fact that this does not create more problems can either be seen as a testimony to the EU’s 
aptitude in papering over conflicts and contradictions or as proof that the bloc’s ambitions as a 
defence union are not being taken seriously, including by those within the union.
However, this essay collection has also shown that, practically speaking, the main problems for 
European defence might not come from the special statuses as such, but from states’ definition of 
them, and their actions. This is reflected in the way that the states interpret both Article 42.7 generally 
and the Irish clause specifically. The authors writing on Finland and Sweden regard the article as 
applying to their countries, and do not consider the Irish clause to be an excuse not to act. This works 
in both directions, as the countries might call upon their EU allies in their hour of need. Denmark 
takes a similar approach, despite its opt-out. Ireland considers Article 42.7 to be valid as a mutual 
defence measure, interpreting the Irish clause as not a full opt-out but a limitation on the ways in 
which Ireland can help others. As Quain argues, Ireland could invoke Article 42.7 itself “in extreme 
circumstances”. Meanwhile, Austria appears to read the Irish clause as an opt-out from Article 42.7 
altogether but seems inclined to invoke the mutual defence clause if it should need support (although 
it does not openly discuss this scenario). As an Austrian legal scholar commented in 2015, this 
unidirectional reading of the defence clause is a “novum” and is “astounding”.
Future developments
It appears to be extremely difficult for the EU to become a true defence union in the sense of an 
alliance whose member states are all equally committed to providing guarantees to support one 
another militarily in the case of an attack. The neutral states could not be part of such an alliance 
without breaking the minimum requirement of neutrality: non-alignment. All talk of a ‘European army
’ appears equally farcical in this context.
Nevertheless, despite all the criticism levelled at it, Article 42.7 appears to be the best possible 
solution for the EU at this stage. Its bilateral character does not involve EU institutions; the Irish 
clause has allowed all special status states to feel comfortable as members of the union. France’s 
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invocation of the article in 2015 and member states’ reactions to this also proved that the article could 
be effective in practice (even if the Paris terrorist attacks, despite their severity, did not pose a serious 
military threat).
The key question concerns how the EU can become a closer and more reliable defence alliance – as 
may become necessary in the future. The EU’s work on the Strategic Compass for its future security 
and defence policy is a step in the right direction. EU defence ministers should include debates on the 
role of special status states in European defence efforts, and should discuss the operationalisation of 
the mutual defence clause in this two-year process. The EU should encourage all national 
governments to share their respective interpretations of EU mutual defence. The discussions 
surrounding the Strategic Compass should involve statements by the neutral and militarily non-
aligned states, and those with an opt-out on defence, on whether and in what circumstances they 
would invoke Article 42.7 in the case of an attack – as well as on how they would react to other 
member states invoking the article.
In this context, the EU or individual member states should game out different mutual defence 
scenarios – an idea supported by the defence ministers of France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. The use 
of so-called wargames or tabletop exercises could help to identify shortfalls in willingness, readiness, 
and military capabilities, which the EU will need to address to pursue its goal of a fully fledged 
defence union.
If it is the EU’s long-term plan to become a defence union, it will need to gain its citizens’ support for 
this. This publication has shown the importance of public opinion in the special status states. Most 
Europeans have not been confronted with an immediate security threat. The long peace in much of 
Europe has contributed to a public sense of security, but also to a lack of interest in understanding 
potential threats. To get a better sense of Europeans’ views of European security issues, the EU should 
conduct a Eurobarometer poll in all member states. The poll should examine Europeans’ threat 
perceptions, their preferences for national or common European defence in the case of an attack, and 
their expectations of the capabilities of a European Defence Union. The Conference on the Future of 
Europe is an ideal platform on which to explore these issues and contribute to a better public 
discussion about European defence.
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